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Abstract 
Survival Analysis method has been commonly used in biology, medical science, and human life insurance studies but it is rarely 
applied in agricultural insurance research. The main objective of this study is to explore the appropriateness of the Survival 
Analysis model for the crop insurance program design. Our analysis was mainly focused on the catastrophic risk premium rate 
estimates under the condition of 70% yield coverage for rice, corn and sorghum in Panjin of Liaoning province, China. The 
results indicate that the estimated premium rates for each crop are consistent with the currently prevailed crop insurance premium 
rate in Panjin.  
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1. Introduction  
Chinese agriculture faces a significant challenge because the population exceeds one-fifth that in the World, but 
holds only 10% of the arable land. An important limitation is that China has only one quarter of the average world 
water resources per person [1], which is a major risk factor in agricultural production. Agriculture production risks 
of crop failure or decreased yields are caused mainly by adverse weather events (drought, excess precipitation, 
floods), followed in small part by pests, diseases, and fire. Few economic sectors are as vulnerable to climatic 
(stochastic) variation [2, 3]. Government intervention to provide assistance to agriculture was widely adopted in 
China since its foundation in 1949, but assistance programs have not been data driven [4-6]. Chinese agriculture has 
experienced losses from frequent natural disasters every year. Significant amounts of governmental disaster relief 
funds are appropriated to mitigate crop and livestock loss to help farmers recover from their production shortfalls. 
Historically, the effectiveness of different forms of government assistance (ad hoc disaster relief, emergency loans, 
crop insurance) has not been systematically analyzed, and are not empirically driven [7]. The major handicap in 
China is the lack of data and analysis on which to base a risk management program [8-11]. More importantly, the 
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risks have not been quantitatively evaluated. Agricultural risk management in China has concentrated on ad hoc 
disaster relief (direct payments, loans) and catastrophic loss assistance (crop insurance).  
China has initiated the agricultural insurance policy experiment but needs a successful agricultural insurance 
program design. Chinese premier Wen has repeatedly emphasized to “strengthen and expand the scope of 
agricultural insurance program and to do well empirical study for policy insurance program since 2003. In recently 
closed third session of 11th China National People’s Congress, Premier Wen again pointed out to accelerate 
agricultural insurance program development. This means that the Chinese central government has a strong resolute 
to implement agricultural insurance program. In fact, up to the end of 2009 there are 16 provinces and autonomous 
regions including Xinjiang Production and Construction Group which had initiated agricultural insurance program 
experiment. However, designing an actuarially based crop insurance program is one of the most challenge tasks. 
Minimally the design has these important requisites: (1) sufficient participation; (2) appropriate rate making; (3) 
data driven program design; and (4) actuarial analysis. Participation in the program must be increased; currently 
participation in the national agricultural insurance is very low, approximately 1-2% of farmers. An equally 
important issue is “how much financial support should the central government and local governments including 
province, city and county provide” and “what kind of insurance coverage is needed.” Thirdly, an effective national 
agricultural risk management plan that can guide insurance for millions of small scale, low technology farms needs 
to be designed based upon empirical data.  
Data availability is the pivotal issue in designing and implementing a successful crop insurance program for 
China [12-14]. Crop insurance programs have a long history but most crop insurance products in China were 
oversimplified with a flat premium rate, invariant indemnity, and arbitrary rates not based on actuarial analysis. 
Lack of connection between risks and insurance costs violates the basic tenets of crop insurance product designs 
[15-17]. Successful and sustainable insurance programs rely inherently on adequate risk assessment to set premium 
rates and long-term planning for extreme risk exposure (i.e., 100 year events) and financing needs (establish 
adequate reserve funds) [18, 19].  
In the present investigation, an actuarially-based pilot crop insurance program for rice, corn, and sorghum is 
developed for Panjin City of Liaoning province in China. 
2.  Methods and Materials 
2.1 Study area  
Panjin city is located in the central-west of Liaoning province of northeastern China. It is situated between 121°-
122° east longitude and 40°-41° north latitude. The city consists of two districts (Shuangtai district and Xinglong 
district) and two counties (Panshan county and Dawa county) with the population of 1.243 million. The area belongs 
semi moisture temperate zone of monsoon climate with a typical four seasons of spring, summer, fall and winter, 
where the annual highest rainfall and temperature occur at the same season. In general, the area has comfortable 
temperature and plenty of sunlight. The annual average daily temperature is 8.6°C with 170-frost–free days, 627 mm 
of annual precipitation, and 2,700 hours of accumulate sun shining.  
There are a total of 214,000 rural households in Panjin with the vast majority of them locates in Panshan and 
Dawa counties where the major cropping agriculture takes place. Crop production is very important to Panjin’s 
economy. There are a total of 132,706 ha of arable land which accounts for 24% of the City’s total land area. In 
comparison with the cultivated land area owned by a typical Chinese farmer, the average farm household in Panjin 
operates a relatively larger cultivated land area: 0.62 ha per household and 0.22 ha per rural capita. In terms of the 
structure of cropping agriculture, the area grows 106,667 ha of rice, 13,333 ha of corn, 3,337 ha of soybeans, and 
3,334 ha of sorghum, with each accounting for 84%, 11%, 3%, and 2%, respectively. The area has reasonable crop 
productivity. From 1986 to 2007, the average crop yield was 9,146 kg/ha for rice, 5,276 kg/ha corn, 5,076 kg/ha 
sorghum, and 4,226 kg/ha soybeans, respectively. Farmers’ household survey indicates that the most important 
concern over the crop production in the area is the yield risk caused by annual yield variation. Historical statistics 
shows that over the last twenty years there were 21,367 ha of cropland suffered from natural disasters annually and 
the most important types of disasters include flooding, drought, pest, hail, and wind with each causing 45%, 37%, 
11%, and 1% of crop yield losses, respectively, each year.  
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2.2 Analytical methods 
Agricultural data for 1986 to 2008 were provided by Panjin Statistical Bureau at the city level. Data are at the 
crop, type, and practice level for rice, corn, and sorghum. Data included: (1) total arable acres, (2) yields, (3) daily 
weather, (4) type of rice crop disease and pest damages, and (5) commodity prices by year. Yield data were 
detrended for county-specific rainfall and year to detect the annual yield fluctuation of each crop, then Survival 
analysis model is used to determine the yield insurance premium rate under different levels of coverage.  
For the survival function:  
Let t be time, T* denote the survival time; assume T* > 0, and, 
S(t) = Pr[T* > t] = 1 í Pr[T* < t] = 1 í F(t) (1) 
where F(t) is CDF of T* assuming that S(0) = 1; S() = 0 and if t1 < t2, then 
S(t1) > S(t2) (2) 
where S(t) is the probability of survival at time t conditional on a specific crop survival to time t. 
Losses at these levels were modeled under a survivor and proportional hazards model. The procedure produces 
the crop-specific proportional hazard function: 
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where hi is crop specific and į is the proportion censored. įi = 1 if failure i.e., ti = Ti*; and 0 if right censored, i.e., Ti 
= Ci. The hazard is the instantaneous rate of failure at time where T* = t conditional on survival to time t, so that the 
following holds: 
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The exact time of failure of a given crop type is not known, and some crops will not fail by the end of the interval. 
Therefore, right censoring will be applied and computations account for this. 
Crop specific actuarial tables are constructed from the survival function: 
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
 is the estimated probability of surviving interval [tj, tj+1] conditional on survival up to tj. 
Exponential regression was used to directly compute the survival probabilities (i.e., 1 – probability of failure) 
computed under the hazards model, deriving the classic “exponent” used in actuarial risk analysis. The exponential 
distribution is essentially the time between two consecutive Poisson events with intensity Ȝ events per unit time such 
that the time sustained between failure times, and if we let X be the distribution of interval time, and x is the time 
after which the second event occurs. In the instance where X > x, then the probability is Pr (X > x) = 1 – F(x) where 
F(x) is the CDF of X (i.e., no Poissson events have occurred before time x). Hence the probability of no events is: 
Pr(0) = e-Ȝx which yields the function: 
1 – F(x) = e-Ȝx  (7) 
Given F(x) = 1 - e-Ȝx , if and only if x > 0, and Ȝ > 0 , the derivative of f(x) = dF(x)/dx gives the probability 
distribution function Ȝ e-Ȝx for all x > 0. Where Ȝ is replaced by 1/į, f(x) = 1/į e-x/į if x > 0, and į > 0. If time at the 
event (i.e., crop loss of a given level) is t0 then the probability of time at the event x > t0 is: 
Pr(X > t0) = 1- Pr(X < t0) = 1 – F(t0) = e-Ȝt0 (8) 
Thus, the exponential regression model used to compute the waiting time between crop failure events is: 
ln (Y) = ln (b0) + b1t0  (9) 
where Y is the waiting time between crop failure events, i.e. survival probability, b0 is the intercept and b1 is the 
exponential regression coefficient. If this is implemented in this application to crop insurance, then survival 
probability under a specific level of crop yield loss becomes: 
Y = b0 × EXP(b1t0)  (10) 
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The model is tested using a Monte Carlo simulation extrapolated to 100 years and cycled 10,000 times to produce 
a stable solution, and a historical (empirical) simulation. The Monte Carlo solution is compared to the empirical 
analysis. The functions can be compared using a log rank test because censoring precludes using the Wilcoxon ranks 
sum test. Using data from two samples: 
(Tij, į ij) for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, …, n 
The null hypothesis to be tested is: 
H0 : S1(t) = S2(t) 
where 
2,1]Pr[)( *  ! jfortTtS jj  (11) 
The logrank test of the H0 is: 
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 where E1, O1 are the expected and actual crop yields at time T, and V1 is the variance.  
3. Study results 
3.1 Crop risk loss rate measurement  
Statistical tests indicate that each of the three crop yield’s survival probability (1-risk loss probability) complies 
with the exponential distribution. All three estimated regression equations (Eq.10) (one for each crop) have 
significant F-statistic at P<0.01. The model coefficients (Eq.10) are utilized to derive values of survival function for 
each of the three crops under 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% yield coverage. Then, Cox regression model is used to 
generate survival curve and compute the correspondent survival probabilities.  
The yield loss probability is computed based on deductable rates of 35%, 30%, 25%, 20%, and 15%, i.e., (1-
survival rate). The number of years that crop loss risk occurrence under a specific insurance coverage can be 
determined by the intersection point between the survival curve and a correspondent horizontal line that represents 
the level of insurance coverage for a particular crop (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. probabilities of basic risk and catastrophic risk losses under various levels of yield coverage 
 
Level of 
coverage 
65 70 75 80 85 65 70 75 80 85 
Basic risk loss Catastrophic risk loss 
Rice .014 .056 .067 .100 .143 .000 .029 .029 .042 .056
Corn .043 .063 .083 .100 .125 .030 .042 .048 .045 .045
Sorghum .056 .063 .083 .111 .143 .038 .038 .043 .059 .067
 
Notice that the annual basic loss risk probability should be identical within the years of interval between one 
event to the next, thus the predicted basic risk probability is 1 divided by the number of years’ interval between two 
loss events under a specific level of insurance coverage. Catastrophic loss is defined as the yield loss in a particular 
crop production cycle which exceeds a fifty percent. The loss rate is determined in the same way as it is done for the 
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basic loss probability. The exact number of years that occur as the magnitude of crop yield loss exceeds 50% can be 
easily identified based on the intersection point between survival curve and a horizontal line which represents 50% 
crop yield loss. The results are listed in Table 1.  
3.2. Determining actuarially based crop insurance premium rate  
Ideally, a pure crop insurance premium rate should cover both basic risk loss and catastrophic risk loss. However, 
the current one flat crop insurance premium rate under policy crop insurance program in China does not give 
consideration to catastrophic risk losses. Obviously, this is not consistent with actuarial theory and internationally 
common practices. Thus, here we are proposing a comprehensive crop insurance premium rate setting, which is 
comprised of four parts: basic risk premium, catastrophic risk premium, reserve fund, and management fees. The 
first two items are socalled pure premium rate, or loss risk rate which is co-shared by the government and insured 
farmers. Farmers only pay part of it, i.e., the portion that is left over after the governmental subsidy. The other two 
parts are completely subsidized by the governments. A common practice is that each category is appropriated based 
on a 20% pure insurance premium cost. The estimated rates of loss risks presented in Table 1 can be directly used to 
calculate pure crop insurance premium (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Estimated pure crop insurance premium rates for rice, corm, and sorghum 
 
Crop type Coverage 
(%) 
Base 
rate 
Cat.‡ 
rate 
Pure 
rate 
Crop type Coverag
e (%) 
Base 
rate 
Cat. 
rate 
Pure
rate
Rice  .014 .000 .014 Rice  .100 .042 .142
Corn 65 .043 .030 .073 Corn 80 .100 .045 .145
Sorghum  .056 .038 .094 Sorghum  .111 .059 .170
Rice  .056 .029 .085 Rice  .143 .056 .199
Corn 70 .063 .042 .105 Corn 85 .125 .045 .170
Sorghum  .063 .038 .101 Sorghum  .143 .067 .210
Rice  .067 .029 .096      
Corn 75 .083 .048 .131      
Sorghum  .083 .043 .126      
‡catastrophic 
 
It is an unexpected coincidence that the results of actuarially based premium rate are very consistent with the 
currently established premium rate standard in Panjin. Using 70% of rice and corn yield insurance coverage as an 
example, the estimated pure premium rates are 8.5% and 10.1% verses to the currently prevailed rates of 8% and 
10%, respectively. This may suggest that the survival analysis model is a very reasonable method for actuarially 
based crop insurance premium rate estimation. 
4. Breakdown of crop insurance premium rate 
4.1 Breakdown of crop insurance premium  
In light of the fact that the current Chinese crop insurance program does not give any consideration to crop 
product revenue under multiple levels of crop yield insurance program, thus, here we are referring to the U.S. crop 
insurance program. For instance, if a farmer selects 65% and 70% yield insurance coverage, the government will 
provide 59% pure premium rate subsidy; for those who select 75%, 80%, and 85% yield insurance coverage, the 
rates of government subsidy are 55%, 48%, and 38% of pure premium rate, respectively. Subtraction of the 
government subsidy from the pure premium rate, the amount left over becomes the farmers’ share of the premium 
cost. Premium share of each category is listed in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Breakdown of premium rate under various levels of yield coverage 
 
Crop Pure 
premium 
rate 
Pure 
premium 
rate 
subsidy a 
Cat. 
premium 
subsidy b
Rate of 
premium 
subsidya+b
Premium 
rate paid 
by a 
farmer c 
Reserve 
fund d 
Mgt. 
fee e 
   65% coverage    
rice .014 .008 .000 .008 .006 .003 .003 
corn .073 .043 .012 .055 .018 .015 .015 
sorghum .094 .055 .016 .071 .023 .019 .019 
   70% coverage    
rice .085 .050 .012 .062 .023 .017 .017 
corn .101 .060 .017 .077 .024 .020 .020 
sorghum .101 .060 .016 .076 .025 .020 .020 
   75% coverage    
rice .096 .053 .013 .066 .030 .019 .019 
corn .131 .072 .022 .094 .037 .026 .026 
sorghum .126 .070 .019 .089 .037 .025 .025 
   80% coverage    
rice .142 .068 .021 .089 .053 .028 .028 
corn .145 .070 .023 .093 .052 .029 .029 
sorghum .170 .082 .031 .113 .057 .034 .034 
   85% coverage    
rice .199 .076 .035 .111 .088 .040 .040 
corn .170 .065 .028 .093 .077 .034 .034 
sorghum .210 .080 .042 .122 .088 .042 .042 
a = pure premium rate with 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage multiplies by government rate of subsidy 
for pure premium rate. Notice that the government subsidy for pure premium rate is 59% under both 65% and 70% 
coverage; and 55%, 48%, and 38% under 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage, respectively. b=catastrophic risk rate under 
a specific level of selected coverage u (1-pure premium subsidy rate). For example, with respect to 65% level of 
coverage in corn, catastrophic subsidy = .030u(1-0.59)=0.012; a+b = government shared premium rate subsidy, i.e., 
the sum of basic premium rate and catastrophic premium rate; c = farmers actually paid premium; and d,e = pure 
premium u 20%. 
4.2 Pricing mechanism for policy crop insurance  
The breakdown of each category of premium shown in Table 3 can be directly used to compute premium price in 
per hectare basis under various levels of coverage. Notice that the second column (Revenue coverage) in Table 4 
(a& b) reflects three levels of the last 4-year average product price coverage: 60%, 80% and 100%, respectively. For 
the sake of space saving, here only rice and corn insurance premium charge results are presented. 
 
Table 4a. Premium charges on rice insurance under various levels of yield coverage (̞/ha) 
 
Level of 
coverage 
Revenue 
coverage 
Gov’t 
premium 
subsidya 
Premium paid 
by farmerd 
Reserve fundc Management 
feeb 
.65 7,020  63  42  21  21  
.70 7,560 469 174 129 129 
.75 8,100  535  243  156  156  
.80 8,640  769  458  245  245  
.85 9,180  1,019  808  365  365  
.65 9,360  84  56  28  28  
.70 10,080 625 232 171 171 
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.75 10,800  713  324  207  207  
.80 11,520  1,025  611  327  327  
.85 12,240  1,359  1,077  487  487  
.65 11,700  105  70  35  35  
.70 12,600 781 290 214 214 
.75 13,500  891  405  259  259  
.80 14,400  1,282  763  409  409  
.85 15,300  1,698  1,346  609  609  
a The governmental premium subsidy = revenue coverage u rate of premium subsidy, which is commonly 
shared by central government, provincial, city, and County governments; b,c revenue coverage u 20% pure premium 
rate; dfarmer’s premium = crop revenue coverage u farmer’s premium rate. 
 
Table 4b. Premium charges on corn insurance under various levels of yield coverage (̞/ha) 
 
Level of 
coverage 
Revenue 
coverage 
Gov’t 
premium 
subsidya 
Premium paid 
by  farmerd 
Reserve fundc Management 
feeb 
.65 5,265  290  95  77  77  
.70 5,670 437 136 115 115 
.75 6,075  571  225  159  159  
.80 6,480  603  337  188  188  
.85 6,885  640  530  234  234  
.65 7,020  386  126  102  102  
.70 7,560 582 182 153 153 
.75 8,100  761  300  212  212  
.80 8,640  804  449  251  251  
.85 9,180  854  707  312  312  
.65 8,775  483  158  128  128  
.70 9,450 728 227 191 191 
.75 10,125  952  375  265  265  
.80 10,800  1,004  562  313  313  
.85 11,475  1,067  884  390  390  
a The governmental premium subsidy = revenue coverage u rate of premium subsidy, which is commonly 
shared by the central government, provincial, city, and County governments; b,c revenue coverage u 20% pure 
premium rate; dfarmer’s premium = crop revenue coverage u premium rate paid by farmer. 
 
4.3 Premium costs shared by the governments 
Using the estimated premium price information presented in Tables 4, it is very convenient to find out how much 
total crop insurance subsidy costs are shared by the central, provincial, and city and county governments, 
respectively. To put those premium costs into perspective, let’s use 70% of crop yield and 100% of the last four year 
average product price coverage as a baseline to estimate the total premium cost shared by each entity. Suppose 80% 
cultivated crop land is insured, which translates into 85,334 ha, 10,666 ha, and 2,667 ha of rice, corn, and sorghum, 
respectively (Table 5). Expected liability represents averaged liability for each insured crop and it is calculated using 
program liability multiplied by the sum of basic risk and catastrophic risk probabilities presented in Table 1 and the 
results are 0.085 for rice, 0.105 for corn, and 0.101 for sorghum, respectively.  
As shown in Table 5, it is expensive to set up a U.S. type of crop insurance program in Panjin area. For instance, 
with a 100% product price coverage, the total government costs reach as high as ̞76.54 mil for rice, ̞9.13 mil for 
corn, and ̞2.17 mil for sorghum. However, it is interested to note that of the total ̞76.54 mil of governmental 
subsidy for rice, ̞66.65 mil is attributed to government premium subsidy accounting for 87% of the total 
government costs, and ̞ 4.95 mil attributed to reserve and management fee which account for 13% total 
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governmental costs. In other words, the governments subsidize 73% premium cost and 84% total program costs for 
rice crop insurance. Needless to say that the government financial burden will be much higher if the program 
participation rate is less than 80%. 
 
Table 5 Premium costs shared between farmers and the governments under 70% yield and 100% product price 
coverage assuming 80% participation rate (̞1,000) 
 
Crop 
type 
Covered  
Area 
(ha)‡ 
Program 
liability 
Expected
liability 
Premium
paid by 
 farmer 
Gov’t  
Premium
subsidy 
Reserve 
fund 
Magt. 
fee 
Total  
gov’t  
costs  
Rice 85,334 1,075,208  91,393  24,747 66,646  4,949  4,949  76,544 
Corn 10,666 100,794  10,583  2,421 8,162  484  484  9,130 
Sorghum 2,667 25,203  2,546  629 1,917  126  126  2,169 
‡ total cultivated crop land area u .80. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The results of an empirical analysis of crop yield losses in PanjinˈLiaoning Province of China (1986-2008) are 
used to design a crop insurance program that established the premium rates for five levels of crop yield insurance 
coverage and three levels of product price coverage for three crops: rice, corn, and sorghum. In the process, the 
survival model was used to estimate the crop yield loss risk probabilities, which are the key information required for 
insurance premium rate determination. The results suggest that it is essential to construct a multiple crop insurance 
coverage in order to improve the program participation rate in China. One of the main reasons bringing about a low 
crop insurance participation rate of the Chinese farmers is contributed to the prevailed universally single flat 
premium rate. Obviously, the sole premium rate can only suit one type of risk preference farmers, thus it greatly 
limits the development of crop insurance program in China.  
Another key point deserves to be made here is that based on 44:32:24 ratio of the current crop insurance subsidy 
cost shares among the central, provincial, and city/county governments, commitment of the county government cost 
share becomes a weakest link in the process of the program implementation, which substantially restricts the crop 
insurance program development in Panjin and elsewhere in China. Farmers located in different counties could not 
equally benefit from the program subsidy provided by the central and provincial governments due to the fact that if a 
county financial department could not appropriate for the 24% share of premium subsidy cost, all farmers in the 
county would not be eligible for receiving the higher level of governments’ financial supports for crop insurance 
program. Oral conversation this author had with the local crop insurance company representative reveals the fact 
that the lack of financial support from the local county governments has jeopardized the seemingly workable crop 
insurance program in Panjin area. Thus, it is critical for the policy makers to give careful thoughts over the financial 
conditions of the local county governments. It may be recommendable that some lenient financial support policy 
may be necessary in order to help farmers in those poor counties benefit from crop insurance subsidy provided by 
the central and provincial governments and at the same time to motivate their interests of participating in crop 
insurance program.  
It was also recommended that the State Council, China's cabinet, and insurance companies should establish a 
catastrophe insurance system in the immediate future to improve the country's risk loss compensation plan. Using 
lessons learned in Panjin’s crop insurance programs over the past several years and the history of the US crop 
insurance program, the largest problem for China in the near future is the management of adverse selection and low 
program participation rate. The same challenge faced the US crop insurance program in the 1980’s and 1990’s when 
adverse selection was pervasive [15, 19]. An additional problem was that prior and existing crop insurance programs 
in China were not empirically based analyses of risk. The third problem is the level of coverage. Given the choices, 
farmers may predictably opt to participate in different levels of coverage. One inducement that may work in 
boosting farmers’ participation rate is to require participation in a crop insurance plan in order to be eligible for any 
other type of government supported program. Eligibility for any agriculture subsidy such as subsidies for seeds, 
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fertilizer, agricultural machinery, and house electronic wares, etc. could demand farmers to buy crop insurance. 
Such inducements will have favorable outcomes. 
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